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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
S T A T E M E N T Q F I S S U E S A N D STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Commonwealth did not breach the terms oj the insurant ? / • :;i lie) h) • not 
defending Chapmans' title against the County's claim:. 
Whether the trial court was correct in determining that Commonwealth had not breached 
the insurance contract by refusing to defend the Chapmans against Uintah County's claim is a 
question of law that this Court reviews for correctness. Holmes Development, L L C i > C< >< )k ; 4 8 
IV/StJK^lM (Utah limi). 
ISSUE 2 I hapmans never raised any cause of action in the trial court for 
compensation resulting from the defect in their title. 
A litigant who fails to raise a claim in the trial court waives his right to raise that claim 
on appeal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Malibu Investment Co. v Sparks, 996 
I 2:< 1 10 13, 10521f3 1 ( I Jti th 2000). 
ISSUE 3 - Chapmans never raised an issue of arbitration in the trial court. 
riiis Court will not consider issues which were not submitted to the trial court and 
concerning which the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact or 
ISSUE 4 - Commonwealth and Basin are not liable in tort to Chapmans, but are 
only responsible to compensate them for the loss occasioned by the 
defect in their title 
1 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness and affirmed 
if the undisputed material facts demonstrate that the successful litigant's position is correct as 
a matter of law. Fashion Place Investment, Ltd v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941, 943 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. Nile Chapman and Roger Chapman (hereinafter 
collectively "Chapmans") purchased property in Uintah County in 1997. (R475, «j[l). At the 
time they purchased the property, they hired Basin to provide title insurance. (R466, ^49). 
Some time after they purchased the property, Uintah County informed them that the road that 
ran across their property was a public right of way, and asked Chapmans to remove a gate that 
they had built across the road. (R38,1ffl9-l0). 
Chapmans and their neighbor Gordon Harmston, trustee of the Eugene Harmston Trust 
(collectively "Plaintiffs") sued Uintah County for a declaration that the road was a private road, 
and Uintah County counterclaimed for a declaration that it was a public road. (R21 -3; R96-90). 
Approximately five months into the litigation, Chapmans added Commonwealth as a defendant. 
(R168-143). Commonwealth had issued a title insurance policy to Chapmans in 1997 through 
its local agent, Basin. In a Second Amended Complaint against both Commonwealth and Basin, 
filed almost a year after the litigation commenced, Chapmans asserted that Commonwealth had 
breached its contract of title insurance by refusing to defend Chapmans against Uintah County's 
claim that the road was public. (R466-465). Chapmans further asserted tort claims against 
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Basin on the allegation that it should have discovered and disclosed to the Chapmans the 
documents on which Uintah County based its claim that the road was public •. (R 465 -462) I lie 
l liiipiiiiims i Li i i i in! Ihi l i 'nmmomuMllh ivh » u JImush habit1 Un H.IMH' lull
 ( I lhf In "I 
Under paragraphs 6 and 7 the policy, Commonwealth has the option to pay the 
Chapmans' loss measured by the diminution in value of the property resulting from the title 
defect. 'UdlM^I'' Jl 1 li«i|>iiiciu.s nv\ ri pk<ul<<l JI i tiusi1 i<l adfnn li'f (li\ lL« »s\ Now Ihckss, 
Commonwealth offered 11 > pa\ il lo them. (R600-598). But Chapmans continued to rest on the 
allegations of the Second Amended Complaint that Commonwealth's refusal to pay their cost 
of defense was a breach of contract. The trial court dismissed this claim on summary judgment 
(R806), but in doing so, preserved their right to plead their loss in dismissing the breach of 
dismissal was without prejudice to their right to recover for their loss claim under the policy. 
(R806, fnl). Thereafter, the Chapmans did not amend their complaint to bring a claim against 
Commonwealth for their loss. Instead, the issues in the case between plaintiffs and Uintah 
Coi u it) w ent to trial 1I: 
The trial court also dismissed the Chapmans' tort claims on summary judgment because, 
under Utah law, neither Basin nor Commonwealth had a duty to Chapmans to act as abstractors 
c >f title. (R806-805). 
1
 In the interim, the Chapmans and Commonwealth could not come to agreement on the 
amount of Chapman's loss, and Commonwealth filed a petition with the American 
Arbitration Association in May 2001 to resolve that issue. The arbitration is still pending. 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: Chapmans brought suit against Uintah County, 
seeking a determination that a road across their property was a private, not a public road. (R21 -
1). Uintah County counterclaimed, asserting that the road was a public county road. (R96-90). 
Five months later, Chapmans amended their Complaint to bring in Commonwealth Land 
Title Insurance Company ("Commonwealth") as a defendant (R168-141). A year after the 
initial complaint, Chapmans filed their Second Amended Complaint, and added Basin Land 
Title and Abstract, Inc. ("Basin") as a defendant. (R476-443). The Fifth through Eighth Claims 
for Relief in the Second Amended Complaint were directed against Commonwealth and Basin 
(R466-462). The trial court dismissed each of these causes of action on summary judgment. 
(R808-804). 
The trial court then scheduled trial of the dispute between Chapmans and Uintah County. 
The jury found that the road was a public road because it had been used continuously by the 
public for more than ten years. (R1802, Rl 119, R 1154 at 378). The trial court entered its 
Order of Judgment on September 28, 2001. (Rl 143-1145). 
This appeal followed. (Rl 148-1149). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. The following facts were undisputed for purposes of the 
trial court's summary judgment ruling (and correspond with the facts as recited on summary 
judgment): 
1. Nile Chapman hired Basin to provide title insurance for his purchase of the 
Fredrickson property which took place in August 1997. (R635, R750). 
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2. At the time Nile Chapman hired Basin, he did not provide any instructions to 
investigate the road that ran through the Fredrickson propertj (R 635, R 7:50), 
3. Additi< * de Basin i vitl i. ail) w i: itten escrow instructions or 
additional instructions of any sort. (R634, R750). 
4. Basin provided Nile Chapman a Commitment for Title Insurance through 
Commonwealth prior to closing on the Fredrickson property. (R634, R750). 
5. Tin i oniiiiiihiiu nil "I'I i l l i n I'linl II Iln mad h',hl: 
Schedule B of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the 
following matters unless the same are disposed of to the satisfaction of the 
company:... 18. Property is not located on a comlty road and company DOES 
NOT INSURE ACCESS. 
(R634,R 750, R 613 R 611) 
6. OMITTED on this appeal as dispi ited 
7. Although Nile Chapman spoke with Ruth Ann Green at Basin about two other 
issues after he received the Commitment, he never asked her about the status of the road. (R634, 
R750). 
them that the road that ran across the property was a public right of way and asked the 
Chapmans to remove a gate they had built across the road. (R634, R750). 
9. When the title insurance policy was issued, it read: 
1
 1 his policy does not insure against loss or damage (and the Company will 
not pay costs, attorney's fees or expenses) which arise by reason of: . , . 
5 
18. Property is not located on a county road and company DOES NOT 
INSURE ACCESS. 
(R634-633; R759, R444-443a). 
10. Another pertinent part of the Policy reads: 
In case of a claim under this policy, the Company shall have the following 
additional options: 
. . . (B) To Pay or Otherwise Settle . . . With the Insured Claimant 
. . . (ii) to pay or otherwise settle with the insured claimant the loss 
or damage provided for under this policy, together with any costs, 
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by the insured claimant, 
which were authorized by the Company up to the time of payment 
and which the Company is obligated to pay. 
Upon the exercise of the Company of either of the options provided for in 
paragraphs (b)(i) or (ii), the Company's obligations to the insured under 
this policy for the claimed loss or damage, other than the payments 
required to be made, shall terminate including any liability or obligation 
to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation. 
(R633, R749; R603 at |6) (emphasis added). 
11. Commonwealth has elected to pay the loss suffered by the Chapmans, as is its 
option under the title insurance policy. (R633; R600-598). 
Chapmans purported to dispute this paragraph on summary judgment, but did so without 
any foundation or citation to the record. (R749). 
12. Under the title insurance policy, a claimant under the policy must provide 
Commonwealth with Proof of Loss or Damage. (R633, R749, R603, f 5). 
13. Under the Policy, all notices, including claims and notices of loss, to 
Commonwealth must be sent to its Consumer Affairs Department in Richmond, Virginia. 
(R633;R602Tfl7). 
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Chapmans purported to dispute this paragraph on summary judgment, but did so without 
any foundation or citation to the record. (R749). 
14. While the Chapmans did write a letter to Basin on March 24, 1999, notifying 
Basin of its alleged claim against the title insurance policy issued by Commonwealth on August 
11, 1997, they did not provide Proof of Loss to Commonwealth, as required under the policy, 
until April 12, 2000. (R632, R749, R596-595, R593-590). 
15. However, Chapmans initiated the lawsuit against Uintah County on April 29, 
1999; Commonwealth was added as a defendant in the Amended Complaint filed on June 11, 
1999 but was not served until October 29, 1999; and Basin became a defendant in the Second 
Amended Complaint filed on March 24, 2000. (R632, R749, R21-3, R168-143, R476-443). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE 1 - COMMONWEALTH DID NOT BREACH THE TERMS OF THE 
INSURANCE POLICY BY NOT DEFENDING CHAPMANS' TITLE 
AGAINST THE COUNTY'S CLAIM. 
A title insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the insurer, and their rights 
under the policy are to be determined under ordinary rules of contract construction. In 
accordance with the policy issued by Commonwealth to Chapman, Commonwealth has 
alternative rights when presented with an insured claim. Commonwealth may defend against 
an adverse claim to title, or Commonwealth may, at its option, pay the loss occasioned by the 
defect in title. The policy defines the measure of compensable loss as a diminution in value of 
the property resulting from the title defect. (R603^f7). In this case, once it learned of the claim, 
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Commonwealth opted to pay the Chapmans5 loss rather than to defend against Uintah County's 
claim that the road which ran across the Chapmans' property was a county road. 
Chapmans' breach of contract claim, set out in its Fifth Claim for Relief, asserted that 
Commonwealth had breached its duty to defend their title against Uintah County's assertions 
of the public nature of the road. But under the contract, Commonwealth has no fixed obligation 
or duty to "clear title" for Chapmans. The policy does not guarantee or insure that there will 
be no losses. It only creates an obligation on the part of Commonwealth to pay the Chapmans' 
loss if it chooses not to proceed with litigation to clear title. Commonwealth made that election 
as it was allowed to do under the policy. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law 
that Commonwealth had not breached the contract by refusing to defend Chapmans' title. 
ISSUE 2- CHAPMANS NEVER RAISED ANY CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE TRIAL 
COURT FOR COMPENSATION RESULTING FROM THE DEFECT IN 
THEIR TITLE. 
The amount and extent of loss that the Chapmans suffered as a result of the defect in 
their title was not an issue in the litigation, because Chapmans never pleaded it. Instead, they 
rested on their allegations that Commonwealth had breached the contract by refusing to defend 
their title. Commonwealth has acknowledged that it has liability to Chapmans to pay their loss, 
and when the trial court dismissed their contract cause of action, the loss claim remained alive. 
The trial court specifically left the door open to Chapmans to raise their loss claim if they 
wished to dispute it, noting that the dismissal was without prejudice to the Chapmans' rights to 
pursue their loss. But Chapmans did not amend their complaint to pursue the loss. Never 
8 
having been raised below, this is an issue that cannot be challenged on appeal. (The loss claim 
is currently the subject of a pending arbitration proceeding that is completely separate from the 
litigation). 
ISSUE 3 - CHAPMANS NEVER RAISED AN ISSUE OF ARBITRATION IN THE 
TRIAL COURT, 
The parties5 arbitration rights under the title policy were never raised as an issue in the 
trial court, and thus, are not properly before this Court. Moreover, Chapmans have not 
established any facts to satisfy the two-pronged standard necessary to demonstrate waiver of 
a contractual right of arbitration - (1) Commonwealth's participation in the litigation was not 
inconsistent with its right to arbitrate the Chapmans' loss claim because the loss claim was not 
an issue in the trial court; and (2) Chapmans have not offered any claim of prejudice. Finally, 
Commonwealth was not required to raise waiver as an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c), 
U.R.Civ.P., because the rule only requires a party to raise affirmative defenses to claims that 
the plaintiff actually raises. 
ISSUE 4 - COMMONWEALTH AND BASIN ARE NOT LIABLE IN TORT TO 
CHAPMANS. BUT ARE ONLY RESPONSIBLE TO COMPENSATE 
THEM FOR THE LOSS OCCASIONED BY THE DEFECT IN THEIR 
TITLE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has squarely held that title insurance agents cannot be liable 
to an insured simply because the commitment or policy contains an error in reflecting title. A 
title insurer can and does assume the risk of its policy. But when a contingency insured against 
9 
in a policy occurs, the insurer is not liable in tort. A title insurer is not an abstractor and cannot 
be sued for abstractor liability. 
Tort liability arises only when the title company assumes duties and responsibilities in 
addition to those undertaken in connection with the issuance of a title commitment or policy. 
Here, Chapmans hired Basin to provide title insurance. They did not provide any instructions 
to investigate the road. They did not provide Basin with any escrow instructions or any written 
instructions of any sort. Basin assumed no duties and performed no actions that would give rise 
to tort liability. Chapmans selectively pick language from the policy and commitment, and 
argue that the words (out of context) show that Basin assumed the duty of an abstractor. Read 
in context, the language to which Chapmans point is nothing more than a statement by Basin 
that it would not and did not insure that the property had any access to a county road. Under 
clear Utah Supreme Court precedent, Basin did nothing that would subject it to tort liability. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 - COMMONWEALTH DID NOT BREACH THE TERMS OF THE 
INSURANCE POLICY BY NOT DEFENDING CHAPMANS9 TITLE 
AGAINST THE COUNTY'S CLAIM. 
In their Fifth Claim for Relief against Commonwealth, Chapmans asserted that 
Commonwealth breached the title insurance contract because it had not defended them against 
Uintah County's claim that the road which ran through their property is a county road. (R466-
465). Whether the trial court was correct in determining that Commonwealth had not breached 
the insurance contract by refusing to defend the Chapmans against Uintah County's claim is a 
10 
question of law that this Court reviews for correctness. Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 48 
P.3d 895 Tf24 (Utah 2002). A title insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the 
insurer, and their rights under the policy are to be determined under ordinary rules of contract 
construction. Id. 
Commonwealth's obligations to Chapmans upon receipt of a claim are spelled out in the 
Conditions and Stipulations to the policy. (R603, ffl[4 and 6). In particular, Sections 4 and 6 
explain the various courses of action available to Commonwealth upon receipt of an insured 
claim. Under Section 4, Commonwealth may defend against insured claims or to prosecute 
actions to establish title. The obligation provided by Section 4 to defend title is "subject to the 
options contained in Section 6 of these Conditions and Stipulations." (R603, f 4). Pursuant to 
Section 6, Commonwealth had the option to pay the Chapmans their loss instead of defending 
title: 
In case of a claim under this policy, the Company shall have the following additional 
options: 
. . . (b) To Pay or Otherwise Settle . . . With the Insured Claimant 
. . . (ii) to pay or otherwise settle with the insured claimant the loss or 
damage provided for under this policy, together with any costs, attorneys' 
fees and expenses incurred by the insured claimant, which were authorized 
by the Company up to the time of payment and which the Company is 
obligated to pay. 
Upon the exercise of the Company of either of the options provided for in paragraphs 
(b)(i) or (ii), the Company's obligations to the insured under this policy for the claimed 
loss or damage, other than the payments required to be made, shall terminate including 
any liability or obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation. 
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(R603?l|6) (emphasis added). The clear language of the Conditions and Stipulations gives 
Commonwealth the right to choose to proceed with litigation or to pay Chapmans' losses 
suffered as a result of the title defect. 
It was undisputed below that Commonwealth elected under the policy to pay the 
Chapmans' loss rather than to defend the litigation.2 In its March 20,2000 letter to Chapmans' 
counsel and again in its September 13,2000 letter (R600-598), Commonwealth acknowledged 
coverage for the claim, indicated that it would pay Chapmans for their loss pursuant to sections 
6 and 7 of the Conditions and Stipulations. Commonwealth noted that Section 7 of the policy 
defines the measure of compensable loss as a diminution in value of the property resulting from 
the title defect, and invited Chapmans to prepare and submit a proof of loss. Id. 
Commonwealth indicated that it would promptly tender payment upon receipt of a sufficient 
basis to assess the claim. Id. Commonwealth's letters constitute full compliance with its 
obligations under the insurance contract. 
The Chapmans' breach of contract against Commonwealth, set out in its Fifth Claim for 
Relief, asserted that Commonwealth had breached its duty to defend title. The claim reads in 
full as follows: 
49. On or before July 16,1997, Plaintiffs Chapman applied through Defendant 
Basin Title for a policy of title insurance from Defendant Commonwealth covering the 
real property forming the subject matter of this action in Sec 31. T8S, R21E. 
2
 Chapmans never even provided Commonwealth with the opportunity to take up the 
defense of Uintah County's claim before suing them for breach of contract. The Chapmans 
initiated the litigation on their own, with an attorney they retained without Commonwealth's 
input or consent and in violation of #4 of the Conditions and Stipulations. 
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50. On or about July 16, 1997, Commonwealth issued Plaintiffs Chapman its 
Title Policy No. 207-899161 ensuring Chapman's title to the real property forming the 
subject matter of this action declaring in Section B, Item 18 thereof: "Property is not 
located on a county road and company DOES NOT INSURE ACCESS." 
51. After notice from Defendant Uintah County regarding the claimed public 
right-of-way over Plaintiff s property, Plaintiffs Chapman duly and properly made claim 
upon Defendant Commonwealth to defend Plaintiffs Chapman against Uintah County's 
claim that Wyasket Bottom Road was a county road. 
52. Despite such demand. Defendant Commonwealth failed, refused and 
neglected to defend Plaintiffs Chapman's quiet use and enjoyment of the subject real 
property, thereby breaching the contract of title insurance issued to Plaintiffs Chapman 
by Defendant Commonwealth. 
53. As and for their damages, Plaintiffs Chapman claim general and special 
damages in an amount to be proven at trial, including, but not limited to attorneys fees 
and costs of suit incurred by Plaintiffs Chapman in defending their right to quiet use and 
enjoyment of the subject property. 
(R466-465) (emphasis added). 
In asserting that Commonwealth breached the contract by refusing to defend against 
Uintah's claimed public right-of-way, Chapmans asked that Commonwealth be compelled to 
do something that the contract did not require. The contract does not purport to "guarantee" 
title. Commonwealth has no fixed obligation or duty to "clear title" for Chapmans. The policy 
does not guarantee or insure that there will be no losses. It only creates an obligation on the part 
of Commonwealth to pay the Chapmans' losses if it chooses not to proceed with litigation to 
clear title. Cf., Securities Serv., Inc. v. Transamerica Title, 583 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1978) (analyzing language of title insurance policy and determining that insurance 
company had option to pay policy limits or defend to judgment). The policy clearly gives 
13 
Commonwealth the option to pay Chapmans' loss rather than defend their title. Thus, the trial 
court correctly ruled as a matter of law that Commonwealth had not breached the contract by 
refusing to defend against Uintah County's claim. 
ISSUE 2- CHAPMANS NEVER RAISED ANY CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE TRIAL 
COURT FOR COMPENSATION RESULTING FROM THE DEFECT IN 
THEIR TITLE, 
Chapmans assert in their brief on appeal that the amount and extent of their loss under 
Section 6 of the contract was a disputed issue and that the trial court could not dismiss their 
breach of contract claim without resolving that issue in a trial on the merits of their loss. But 
their loss claim against Commonwealth was not an issue in the litigation. Instead, the 
Chapman's breach of contract claim was that Commonwealth was liable for damages resulting 
from its failure to defend Chapmans' title against Uintah County. (R466-465). When the trial 
court dismissed their breach of contract claim, the amount and extent of the Chapmans' loss due 
to the title defect was not affected - it simply was not an issue before the trial court. 
Nor was the issue ever brought to the trial court. Chapmans were not entitled under the 
policy to any coverage for their loss until they provided Commonwealth with a Proof of Loss 
or Damage. (R603 ^|5). Paragraph 7 of the Conditions and Stipulations defines the measure of 
compensable loss as diminution in value. (R603 ^|7). In their April 12, 2000 Proof of Loss, 
Chapmans indicated that quantifying diminution in value was difficult, and insisted that 
Commonwealth was required to pay their costs of defending their title against Uintah's claim. 
(R593-590). Commonwealth responded by noting that the policy did not require it to defend 
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Chapmans' title, and requested Chapmans, if they could not accurately state the loss in terms 
of diminution in value, to provide factual information relevant to the diminution in value 
assessment so that an appraisal could be ordered. (R600-598). Chapmans continued to insist 
that Commonwealth pay to defend their title, and rested on the allegations they had set forth in 
their pleadings, i.e., that Commonwealth's refusal to defend title constituted a breach of the 
policy. 
When the trial court dismissed Commonwealth's breach of contract claim on summary 
judgment, it left the door open to Chapmans to raise their loss claim if they wished to dispute 
the amount and extent thereof.3 In its order of dismissal, the trial court noted that Chapmans 
still had rights under Section 6, and ordered that the dismissal of their breach of contract claim 
was without prejudice to pursue their rights under that section. (R806, fill). Commonwealth 
has acknowledged liability to Chapmans under that section.4 The Chapmans could have 
amended their complaint to assert a dispute against Commonwealth over the amount and extent 
of their loss claim. But they did not amend their complaint to further pursue Commonwealth. 
3
 Note that Chapmans would not have been entitled to raise the loss claim as a defense 
to Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment. A plaintiff is not allowed to amend his 
complaint by raising unpleaded claims or theories of recovery in opposition to summary 
judgment. Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895, 904 (Utah 2002). 
4
 Contrary to Chapmans' assertion, acknowledging liability for the loss that Chapmans 
suffered as a result of Uintah's County's adverse title claim does not constitute an admission 
of liability for breach of contract. The nature and purpose of a title insurance policy is to 
indemnify the insured against losses suffered by reason of title defects. Valley Bank & Trust 
Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins.Co. of Dallas, 776 P.2d 933, 935 (Utah App. 1989). Far from 
breaching its obligations under the contract, Commonwealth's acknowledgment of liability 
under Section 6 constitutes compliance of its obligations under the insurance contract. 
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Instead, they proceeded to trial against Uintah County on the merits of their assertions about the 
nature of the road and with this appeal. Thus, the loss claim was never an issue in the trial 
court. 
The loss claim remains a live issue between the Chapmans and Commonwealth. It is the 
currently the subject of a pending arbitration proceeding that is completely separate from the 
litigation and that has nothing to do with this proceeding on appeal. But it was not an issue in 
the trial court, and thus, it is not an issue that can be challenged in this appeal. See, Malibu 
Investment Co. v. Sparks, 996 P.2d 1043,10521}34 (Utah 2000) (litigant who fails to raise claim 
in trial court waives right to raise claim on appeal of trial court's grant of summary judgment). 
ISSUE 3 - CHAPMANS NEVER RAISED AN ISSUE OF ARBITRATION IN THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Nor were the parties' rights to arbitration under the title policy raised as an issue in the 
trial court, although Chapmans have argued those rights in their Brief on appeal.5 Months after 
the hearing on Commonwealth's summary judgment motion, and after the trial court had 
dismissed the Chapmans' complaint against Commonwealth, Commonwealth filed a Demand 
for Arbitration with the AAA, as is its right under section 14 of the Conditions and Stipulations, 
for a determination of the Chapmans' loss claim. At that point in time, i.e., May 2001, 
Commonwealth had been dismissed out of the lawsuit on summary judgment, and Chapmans 
had not sought leave to amend their complaint to bring Commonwealth back in as a defendant 
5
 At the hearing on summary judgment, the Court mentioned that the loss claim might 
be determined through arbitration, but specifically noted that it was not ruling on that issue. 
(R1150,pp.67-68). 
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for a determination of the loss claim. Chapmans now argue on appeal that Commonwealth had 
waived its right to arbitration. But since the loss claim was never raised as an issue in the 
lawsuit, Commonwealth's right to arbitrate the loss claim was never raised. Accordingly, the 
issue is not properly before this Court. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 
645 P.2d 667,672 (Utah 1982) (appellate court "will not consider on appeal issues which were 
not submitted to the trial court and concerning which the trial court did not have the opportunity 
to make any findings of fact or law"). 
Nor is Chapmans' argument regarding waiver correct. The standard in Utah for deter-
mining whether a party has waived a contractual right of arbitration is two-pronged - a partici-
pation in litigation inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, and a finding of prejudice. Chandler 
v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356,360 (Utah 1992). These are factual questions, 
and the party who claims waiver has the burden of establishing the facts. Id. at 359. The only 
contract claim for which Chapmans sued Commonwealth was an alleged breach of contract for 
its failure to defend Chapmans' title. But the amount of Chapmans' loss under the title policy 
was never at issue in the litigation. That issue remains a live one between the parties, outside 
of the litigation, and separate from the legal issue that the trial court determined on summary 
judgment, i.e., that Commonwealth was not obligated under the contract to defend Chapmans' 
title. Commonwealth's participation in the litigation was not inconsistent with its right to 
arbitrate the amount of loss that Chapmans suffered. Chapmans have failed to meet the first 
prong of the test. 
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The second prong of the test requires Chapmans to establish prejudice. As the party 
claiming waiver, Chapmans must establish prejudice that "relate[s] to the delay in the assertion 
of the right to arbitrate, and . . . [is] of such a nature that the party opposing arbitration suffers 
some real harm...." Id. at 360. In their Brief, Chapmans do not offer any claim of prejudice at 
all. Without such proof, their waiver argument must be rejected outright. 
With regard to Chapman's argument on Rule 8(c) U.R.Civ.P., the rule only requires a 
party to raise in his answer all affirmative defenses that he has to claims that the plaintiff 
actually raises in his complaint. The only contract claim Chapmans made in the trail court was 
that Commonwealth was obligated to defend their title. Chapmans did not raise their loss claim, 
and Commonwealth was not obliged under Rule 8(c) to raise the arbitration clause as an 
affirmative defense. 
The parties' rights to arbitration under the title policy never having been raised as an 
issue in the trial court, they are not properly before this Court on appeal. 
ISSUE 4 - COMMONWEALTH AND BASIN ARE NOT LIABLE IN TORT TO 
CHAPMANS. BUT ARE ONLY RESPONSIBLE TO COMPENSATE 
THEM FOR THE LOSS OCCASIONED BY THE DEFECT IN THEIR 
TITLE, 
It is established Utah law that title insurance agents cannot be liable to an insured simply 
because the commitment or policy contains an error in reflecting the title. Culp Construction 
Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650,653 (Utah 1990). Only in instances where a title insurance 
agent specifically assumes responsibilities of an abstractor can the title insurance agent be liable 
in negligence to its insured. Id. at 655. In this case, Basin did not assume any such 
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responsibilities, nor was it asked to do so by the Chapmans. The trial court did not err in 
determining that Basin was not liable in negligence for failing to discover that the road across 
the Chapmans' property was a county road.6 
A. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS SQUARELY HELD THAT A TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE IN TORT FOR 
MISTAKES IN REPORTING TITLE. 
Commitments for title insurance are simply statements of terms and conditions under 
which an insurer is willing to issue its title policy. Culp, 795 P.2d at 653. While Chapmans 
urge, without citation, that "a title insurer is hired by the insured to render a report of recorded 
documents," (Chapman's Brief, p. 18), the Utah Supreme Court disagrees: 
One who hires a title insurance company does so for the purpose of obtaining the 
assurance or guarantee of obtaining a certain position in the chain of title rather 
than for the purpose of discovering the title status. A title insurance company's 
function is generally confined to the practice of insurance, not to the practice of 
abstracting. 
Culpy 795 P.2d at 654. The Culp Court went on to explain that an abstract of title is "[a] 
condensed history of the title to the land," reporting the material recorded conveyances or any 
other estate or interests therein. Id. Under Utah law, a title insurer has no duty to abstract title 
for its customers. Thus, contrary to Chapmans' position, Basin had no duty to render them a 
report of recorded documents. 
6
 Chapmans' claim against Commonwealth for negligence was based on principles of 
vicarious liability. That claim was dismissed when the trial court dismissed the negligence 
claim against Basin, and Chapmans have not appealed that ruling. Accordingly, this Briefs 
discussion of the negligence claim will refer to only Basin, although the arguments are 
equally applicable to Commonwealth. 
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String-citing cases from other jurisdictions, the Chapmans argue that a title insurer can 
be sued for professional negligence or malpractice in many states. The Chapmans even cite to 
Culp, apparently misunderstanding, or perhaps ignoring the holdings of the Utah Supreme Court 
in that case. The Culp Court specifically rejected this notion, first examining the concept 
established in other states, and then spurning it in favor of the prevailing view that a title insurer 
is not liable in tort simply for making mistakes in reporting title to its customer. Culp at 653.7 
The prevailing view is explained at some length by the California Court of Appeals in a case 
on which the Culp Court relied: 
Title insurance is a contract for indemnity under which the insurer is obligated to 
indemnify the insured against losses sustained in the event that a specific contingency, 
e.g., the discovery of a lien or encumbrance affecting title, occurs. [Citations omitted]. 
The policy of title insurance, however, does not constitute a representation that the 
contingency insured against will not occur. [Citations omitted]. Accordingly, when such 
contingency occurs, no action for negligence or negligent misrepresentation will lie 
Chapmans seem to attempt to distinguish Culp by asserting that the case differentiates 
between the title policy and the commitment. (Chapman's Brief, p. 16, fh 2). But any 
attempt to step outside the principles ofCulp on the basis of the fact that the final policy that 
Basin issued contained the same statements as the commitment is unavailing. Culp did 
address a commitment for title insurance, and not the policy itself. But the Culp Court cited 
to many cases where the courts were examining preliminary reports as well as the final 
policies. Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 192 Cal. App. 3d 70, 76 (Cal. App. 1987) 
(holding that liability for negligence under both preliminary report and policy not 
supportable); Brown's Tie & Lumber v. Chicago Title Co. of Idaho, 764 P.2d 423,425 (Idaho 
1988) (interpreting Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 82 (Idaho 1982) and holding that 
contract for title insurance and policy is source of duty between parties, not negligence 
principles); Horn v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., 557 P.2d 206,208 (N.M. 1976) (holding that any 
duty on part of title company to search records comes from policy); Walker Rogge, Inc. v. 
Chelsea Title & Guaranty Co., 562 A.2d 208, 219 (N.J. 1989) (discussing prevailing view 
of no tort liability for title companies and examining cases involving both commitments and 
policies). Given Culp's recognition that title insurers are not abstractors, there is no rational 
differentiation between the commitment for insurance and the policy itself. 
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against the insurer based upon the policy of title insurance alone. [Citations omitted] 2 
Miller and Starr, Current Law of California Real Estate, supra, summarizes governing 
law: ff[T]he insurer does not represent expressly or impliedly that the title is as set forth 
in the policy; it merely agrees that, and the insured only expects that, the insurer will pay 
for any losses resulting from, or he will cause the removal of, a cloud on the insured's 
title within the policy provisions." (Id., at § 12.79, pp. 385-386.) The treatise further 
notes: "A title policy is not a summary of the public records and the insurer is not 
supplying information; to the contrary he is giving a contract of indemnity. A title 
insurer, as any other insurer, can and does assume the risk of its policy. Every insurer can 
and does contract to indemnify against specific risks...." (Id., at fn. 6, p. 385.) 
Accordingly, when the contingency insured against under the policy occurs, the 
title insurer is not, by that fact alone, liable to the insured for damages in contract or tort, 
but rather, is obligated to indemnify the insured under the terms of the policy. 
Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 192 Cal.App.3d 70, 74-75 (1987), cited in Culp} 795 P.2d 
at 653, fn. 4. While courts in other states may charge title insurers with negligence for making 
mistakes in connection with the issuance of a title commitment or policy, Utah clearly does not. 
B. BASIN ASSUMED NO DUTIES OR RESPONSIBILITIES APART FROM 
ISSUING THE TITLE COMMITMENT AND POLICY WHICH WOULD 
EXPOSE IT TO ANY TORT LIABILITY. 
While a title company is not absolutely immune from tort liability, such liability only 
arises when the company assumes duties and responsibilities in addition to those undertaken in 
connection with the issuance of a title commitment or policy. Culp is a good example of the 
circumstances under which such liability is imposed. Other examples occur in the Utah cases 
cited by Chapman, to wit, Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), cert. 
den. 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990) and Christensen v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 
302 (Utah 1983). In each of these cases, the title company's liability for negligence was 
predicated on acts other than the issuance of a title commitment or policy. 
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In Culp, the insurer's agent received escrow instructions specifically directing the agent 
not to transfer loan funds unless the title status remained the same as on the commitment. The 
Culp Court held that the agent had undertaken a commitment beyond issuing the title insurance 
policy, i.e., the obligation not to disburse funds unless the title remained as specified. Culp, 795 
P.2dat655. 
Similarly, in Christensen, the Plaintiffs claim for negligent misrepresentation arose out 
of the title company providing misleading information in its assumed capacity as bookkeeper 
for the landowner developer and its lender. Christensen, 666 P.2d at 306. There was no 
question in the case about any title insurance policy or a commitment, or mistakes made in 
preparing such documents. Instead, it was the title company's bookkeeping errors that formed 
the basis for its tort liability. 
Finally, in Wycalis, the title company, acting as trustee under the trust deed, had released 
the plaintiff/beneficiary's interest in the trust deed on the basis of a forged request for 
reconveyance. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 823. The plaintiff accused the title company of negligence, 
claiming that the standard of care owed by the title company to her required more than 
unquestioning reliance on the forged request. Id. at 826. No question of the title company's 
obligation to report title was even remotely involved. 
In the instant matter, Basin assumed none of the types of duties and performed none of 
the actions that formed the basis for liability in Culp, Christensen, or Wycalis, Here, after Basin 
issued the commitment for the insurance policy, Chapmans' only discussions with Basin 
involved water certificates and the addition of Roger Chapman to the commitment. (R621 (a):6-
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16). Although the commitment excepted from coverage the issue of the road status, Chapmans 
never discussed the status of the road on the property with Basin, not when they hired Basin to 
provide an insurance policy, nor after the commitment for insurance was issued. (R621:14-19; 
R620:9-11). Chapmans did not request that Basin abstract the title nor investigate whether the 
road was a public right-of-way. (R620:9-l 1). Chapmans did not provide any written instruc-
tions to Basin regarding escrow or closing or requesting that Basin assess the status of road or 
abstract title of the property. (R621:20-22). Chapmans did not request, and therefore, Basin 
did not assume additional responsibilities or duties beyond providing title insurance in 
connection with closing on the property. As a result, under the precedent pronounced by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Culp, Basin has no tort liability to Chapmans. 
Selectively picking language from the policy and the commitment, Chapmans argue that 
Basin assumed the duty of an abstractor by stating in those documents that "[the] Property is not 
located on a county road...". But Chapmans may not discriminatorily choose only those words 
which appear to help them. This language must be read in the context in which it was included, 
which is as a policy exception listed on Schedule B-2. In context, the language is part of an 
entire sentence, which reads: 
This policy does not insure against loss or damage (and the Company will not pay costs, 
attorney's fees or expenses) which arise by reason of: . . . 18. [The] Property is not 
located on a county road and company DOES NOT INSURE ACCESS. 
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(R4444, R443(a).8 This sentence does not guarantee or offer a legal conclusion that the road 
running through the property is a private road, as Chapmans urge. What the sentence says is 
that there is no insurance coverage that the property has access to a county road. While the 
sentence may have been more artfully drafted, Chapmans offer no citations that would allow 
them to recover in tort on the basis of a clause, read out of context, contained in an exception 
in a title policy. If Chapmans' argument were to be accepted, the principles in Culp would have 
to be rejected. A title commitment is no more than a statement of terms and conditions upon 
which the insurer is willing to insure the title of the property. Culp, 795 P.2d at 653. The policy 
itself is an agreement the insurer will pay for any losses resulting from, or it will cause the 
removal of, a cloud on the insured's title within the policy provisions. Lawrence, 192 
Cal.App.3d at 75. In context, the language to which Chapmans point is nothing more than a 
statement by Basin that it would not and did not insure that the property had any access to a 
county road. Under Culp, Basin cannot be held liable to the Chapmans for negligence. 
The language in the commitment was practically identical: 
Schedule B of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the 
following matters unless the same are disposed of to the satisfaction of the 
company:... 18. Property is not located on a county road and company DOES 
NOT INSURE ACCESS. 
(R611,R613). 
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C. BASIN HAS NO DUTY TO CHAPMANS UNDER U.C.A. §31A-20-110 (1) 
TO PERFORM A TITLE ABSTRACT SEARCH. 
Chapmans also fail to properly read Culp in arguing that U.C.A. §31 A-20-110(1) a title 
insurer can be held liable for negligence for making mistakes in reporting title. Addressing this 
very issue, the Utah Supreme Court in Culp specifically noted that: 
[E]ven though section 31 A-20-110(1) imposes a duty of a reasonable search and 
examination for the purpose of determining the insurability of title, it does not 
impose a duty to abstract titles upon title insurance companies. 
Culp, 795 P.2d at 654 (emphasis added). The statute states on its face that it "does not create, 
eliminate, or modify any private cause of action or remedy." §31 A-20-110(3). The statute is 
in the nature of a reporting requirement, mandating that insurers maintain the examination 
materials for a period of time, and enforceable only by the insurance commissioner. §31A-20-
110(1) to (3). Thus, a title company must complete a search to protect itself as indemnitor 
against losses covered by its policy and to satisfy reporting requirements established by the 
insurance commissioner. But the section does not impose a duty on title insurers to provide an 
abstract of title to a policy holder. Section 31 A-20-110(1) simply does not create a cause of 
action against either Basin or Commonwealth.9 
9
 Absent any duty to correctly report all matters that might affect title, it is irrelevant 
whether Basin's title search met industry standards. Thus, the trial court did not need to 
address Chapmans' failure to introduce affidavits regarding the standard of care. However, 
contrary to Chapmans' argument, it was not Basin's obligation to submit affidavits on 
summary judgment to negate the claim of negligence. Relying on the undisputed facts and 
on Culp, Basin set out a prima facie case that Chapman's negligence claim should be 
dismissed on summary judgment. Having done so, the burden shifted to Chapmans to 




For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's court's grant of summary judgment, 
dismissing the claims that Chapmans raised against Commonwealth and Basin, should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this J_T^day of September, 2002. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Richard A. Rappaport 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorneys for Appellees Commonwealth Land 
Title Insurance Company and Basin Land Title 
& Abstract, Inc. 
9(...continued) 
of care to be applied. See, Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. DeBry, 38 P.3d 984, 991, ffl|18, 
20 and fn 7 (Utah App. 2001)("Under Rule 56(e), once the proponent of summary judgment 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the opponent to provide some evidence 
in opposition to the motion and in support of the essential elements of her claim."). Further, 
Chapmans cite to no legal authority that would support their assertion that a self-imposed 
standard of care is evidence of the standard of care for the title industry in general. 
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APPENDIX 1 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Title Insurance Contract) 
48. As and for their Fifth Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs Chapman adopt and incorporate all 
allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-26 hereof, as if the same were fully set forth herein. 
49. On or before July 16,1997, Plaintiffs Chapman applied through Defendant Basin Title 
for a policy of title insurance from Defendant Commonwealth covering the real property forming the 
subject matter of this action in Sec 31. T7S, R21E. 
50. On or about July 16,1997, Commonwealth issued Plaintiffs Chapman its Title Policy 
No. 207-899161 ensuring Plaintiffs Chapman's title to the real property forming the subject matter 
of this action declaring in Schedule B, Item 18 thereof: "Property is not located on a county road and 
company DOES NOT INSURE ACCESS". A copy of the policy is attached as Exhibit 5. 
51. After notice from Defendant Uintah County regarding the claimed public right-of-way 
over Plaintiffs property, Plaintiffs Chapman duly and properly made claim upon Defendant 
Commonwealth to defend Plaintiffs Chapman against Uintah County's claim that Wyasket Bottom 
Road was a county road. 
52. Despite such demand, Defendant Commonwealth failed, refused and neglected to 
defend Plaintiffs Chapman's quiet use and enjoyment of the subject real property, thereby breaching 
the contract of title insurance issued to Plaintiffs Chapman by Defendant Commonwealth. 
53. As and for their damages, Plaintiffs Chapman claim general and special damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial, including, but not limited to, attorney's fees and costs of suit incurred 
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Appendix l 
by Plaintiffs Chapman in defending their right to quiet use and enjoyment of the subject property. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Negligent Misrepresentation /Failure to Disclose) 
54. As and for their Sixth Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs Chapman adopt and incorporate all 
allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-26 and 49-51 as if the same were fully set forth here. 
55. The absence of a public right-of-way over the Chapman Property was a material 
consideration to Plaintifls Chapman in purchasing the subject property located in Sec. 31, T7S, R2 IE. 
56. Defendant Basin Title undertook, as a professional abstractor for hire, to perform a 
title search of all public records and documents relating to the Chapman Property. 
57. In performing its search of public records, Basin Title found or should have found in 
the exercise of professional abstract activities, various documents recorded by Defendant Uintah 
County asserting and declaring that the road over the Chapman Property was a "public highway" for 
the use, benefit and right-of-way by the public ("County Declarations"). 
58. Upon issuing a Commitment of Title Insurance to Plaintiffs Chapman, Defendant Basin 
Title affirmatively represented to Plaintiffs Chapman that the road over the Chapman Property was 
not a public road: to wit, Schedule B, Item 18, of Exhibit 5. 
59. Defendant Basin Title failed, refused and neglected to disclose to Plaintiffs Chapman 
the existence of the County Declarations and further failed to disclose the claim by Defendant Uintah 
County that the road over the Sec. 31 Property was a public right-of-way. 
60. Defendant Basin Title knew, or reasonably should have known, that its representations 
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APPENDIX 2 
650 Utah 795 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
motion has merit, the trial court must so 
advise the appellate court, and the moving 
party may then request a remand. Ryan 
v. United States Lines Co., 303 F.2d 430 
(2d Cir.1962); Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 601 F.2d 39 
(1st Cir.1979); Duriron Co. v. Bakke, 431 
P.2d 499 (Alaska 1967); Life of the Land v. 
Ariyoshi 553 P.2d 464 (Haw.1976). This 
court has never been confronted with this 
problem, prior to this case, although the 
Utah Court of Appeals recently adopted 
the second rule described above in Baker v. 
Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). We now do the same. 
This court has long followed the general 
rule that the trial court is divested of juris-
diction over a case while it is under advise-
ment on appeal.3 We have made excep-
tions to the rule, in the interest of prevent-
ing unnecessary delay, where any action by 
the trial court is not likely to modify a 
party's rights with respect to the issues 
raised on appeal. Thus in Peters v. Peters, 
15 Utah 2d 413, 394 P.2d 71 (1964), we held 
that the district court, which has continu-
ing jurisdiction after entry of a final di-
vorce decree, may adjudicate a petition to 
modify the decree due to a change of cir-
cumstances while the decree is pending on 
appeal since the petition for modification is 
collateral to the divorce decree. Similarly, 
where the trial court has, pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), certified as 
final a judgment against one party in a 
multi-party action, the remainder of the 
action remains in the trial court and is not 
necessarily affected by the appeal. In that 
case, the trial court has jurisdiction to pro-
ceed with the claims remaining unadjudi-
cated. Lane v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333 
(Utah 1984). 
[4,5] In the instant case, defendants 
seek to reduce the judgment against them 
by amounts which they aver have already 
been paid to plaintiff.4 An adjudication of 
the motion, though a modification of the 
judgment may result, will not affect the 
legal issues raised here with respect to 
3. See, e.g.t Smith v. Kimball 76 Utah 350, 289 P. 
588 (1930). 
attorney fees and defendants' liability. 
Under these circumstances, we see no need 
to suspend our jurisdiction while the dis-
trict court has the matter under considera-
tion, as that will only delay proceedings. 
Instead, the trial court should hear the rule 
60(b) motion and may deny it without inter-
ference from this court. If the motion is 
granted, the trial court in this case need 
only advise this court that the judgment 
has been modified. The district court ac-
tion granting or denying the motion and 
the modified judgment should be included 
in the record when it is prepared for review 
by this court. 
Defendants' motion to stay proceedings 
and remand the case to the district court is 
denied, and the district court is directed to 
hear and determine the rule 60(b) motion. 
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
and Federal Insurance 
Company, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited 
partnership, et al., Defendants. 
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, and Appellant, 
v. 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE COR-
PORATION, Defendant, Third-Party 
Defendant, and Appellee. 
No. 880388. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 27, 1990. 
Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1990. 
Lender brought action against title in-
surer for breach of contract and negligent 
4. We, of course, express no opinion on the mer-
its of the motion, that being for the trial court to 
determine. 
CULP CONST. CO. v. 
Cite as 795 P.2d 
misrepresentation. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. Uno, 
J., granted summary judgment for insurer, 
and appeal was taken. The Supreme 
Court, Hall, C.J., held that: (1) title insurer 
was not abstractor of title, and (2) fact 
issue existed as to whether insurer was 
liable for negligent misrepresentation. 
Remanded. 
BUILDMART MALL Utah 651 
650 (Utah 1990) 
summary judgment for insurer in lender's 
action for negligent misrepresentation. 
Howe, Associate C.J., concurred in re-
sult. 
1. Appeal and Error <s>934(l) 
On appeal from summary judgment, 
reviewing court looks at facts in light most 
favorable to party opposing summary judg-
ment. 
2. Abstracts of Title <£=>3 
Title insurer did not breach contractual 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, though 
it allegedly failed to update commitment 
for insurance to show existence of addition-
al liens, where insurer fully and adequately 
defended insured's lien position, as it was 
obligated to do by terms of policy. 
3. Abstracts of Title <®=>3 
Title insurer could not be held liable in 
tort for abstractor's error in commitment 
for insurance; insurer owed insured no 
duty to abstract title. 
4. Torts <s=>3 
Statutory requirements that give rise 
to independent causes of action under vari-
ous unfair practices acts may also give rise 
to independent tort actions. 
5. Action <s=»27(l) 
Tort of negligent misrepresentation 
could be asserted against title insurer sepa-
rately from breach of contract claim, 
though alleged misrepresentation arose out 
of contractual relationship of parties. 
6. Judgment <s=>181(23) 
Issue of material fact as to whether 
title insurer knew that it would be relying 
on insurance commitment made to mort-
gage broker when making loan precluded 
John P. Ashton, Brian S. King, Salt Lake 
City, and John A. Kincaid, Jr., John R. 
O'Keefe, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant, 
third-party plaintiff, and appellant. 
Jeffrey R. Oritt, Robert S. Howell, Salt 
Lake City, and Mark T. Davenport, Doug 
T. Butler, Dallas, Tex., for defendant, 
third-party defendant, and appellee. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Tower Federal Savings and Loan Associ-
ation appeals from a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Lawyers Title Insur-
ance Corporation. The trial court found 
that no genuine issue of material fact exist-
ed with regard to Tower Federal Savings 
and Loan Association's complaint that Law-
yers Title Insurance Corporation owed 
Tower Federal Savings and Loan a duty to 
disclose all record title information. We 
affirm in part and reverse in part. 
FACTS 
[1] On appeal from summary judgment, 
we look at the facts in a light most favor-
able to the party opposing summary judg-
ment.1 
In September 1983, Buildmart Mall, a 
Utah limited partnership, was established 
to develop and construct, in Salt Lake 
County, a retail shopping mall and ware-
house distribution center, specializing in 
custom building materials. Funding for 
the project was essentially generated from 
the sale of industrial development revenue 
bonds ("IRBs") in the face amount of 
$7,750,000. First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A. ("First Security"), acted as indenture 
trustee on the IRB loan through its corpo-
rate trust department. The deed of trust 
securing the IRB loan was recorded on 
September 26, 1984, in the Salt Lake Coun-
ty Recorder's office. 
During the summer of 1984, the principal 
of the project determined that a funding 
shortfall of approximately $500,000 existed 
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for the completion of the project. Tower 
Federal Savings and Loan Association 
("Tower") was approached by a mortgage 
broker, Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Cor-
poration ("Richards-Woodbury"), with re-
spect to lending Buildmart Mall $750,000, 
secured by a second position deed of trust 
to the project, in order to complete con-
struction. 
Richards-Woodbury retained Lawyers 
Title Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Ti-
tle") to provide a commitment for title in-
surance and issue a title insurance policy. 
Richmond Title Company ("Richmond Ti-
tle"), the local agent for Lawyers Title, 
furnished Richards-Woodbury with a com-
mitment for title insurance that revealed 
certain encumbrances and liens against the 
title. Richmond Title also acted as local 
agent for Lawyers Title in writing the sub-
sequent title policy. 
On March 18, 1985, Jeffery K. Wood-
bury, acting as agent for Tower, wrote a 
letter to Richmond Title delineating escrow 
instructions for the funds to be loaned by 
Tower. Richmond Title was instructed, 
among other things, to deposit the funds 
into an escrow account and to release the 
funds to Buildmart Mall only when Rich-
mond Title had taken steps to "insure that 
the Trust Deed enclosed herewith . . . is in 
a second lien position behind [First Security 
Bank]" and "[t]he only prior exceptions to 
the Trust Deed should be those listed in 
your Commitment for Title Insurance/' In 
addition, the escrow instructions directed 
Richmond that if it was "unable or unwill-
ing to promptly follow all of the above 
referenced instructions," it was to forego 
disbursement of the funds. 
Prior to the Tower loan's closing but 
after the commitment for title insurance 
("the commitment") had been issued, nu-
merous liens appeared of record that were 
not reported by Lawyers Title or Richmond 
Title on the commitment. Richmond never-
theless disbursed the funds, and the Tower 
loan was secured by a second deed of trust 
that was recorded on March 20, 1985, in the 
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
Sometime after March 20, 1985, the de-
veloper defaulted on its loan with Tower, 
as well as its obligations under the IRB 
i loan. Culp Construction Company 
s ("Culp"), the developer's primary general 
'  contractor, filed a complaint on September 
 3, 1985, naming Tower as one of the defen-
, dants. Tower tendered its defense of the 
t litigation to Lawyers Title under the terms 
of the title insurance policy. Lawyers Title 
accepted the tender of defense subject to a 
5 reservation of rights. 
First Security initiated nonjudicial fore-
• closure proceedings against the project as 
trustee under the indenture of trust and, 
" on March 16, 1987, held a trustee's sale at 
y which First Security acquired the project. 
* As a result of the foreclosure proceedings, 
I all liens junior to the first lien held by First 
5
 Security, including the Tower trust deed, 
' were extinguished by operation of law. 
" Tower and its counsel did not take any 
action to stop the foreclosure sale or pro-
tect its security interest. 
1
 A settlement was reached between all 
parties, resulting in the dismissal of all 
claims with prejudice, with the exception of 
the claims between Tower and Lawyers 
;
 Title. All outstanding mechanics's liens on 
1
 the project were released as part of the 
settlement. 
On appeal from summary judgment in 
favor of Lawyers Title, Tower asserts that 
there are genuine issues of material fact 
with respect to three causes of action: 
breach of contract, breach of an implied 
contractual obligation of good faith and 
fair dealing, and negligent misrepresenta-
tion. 
I. BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Tower's first claim is that Lawyers Title 
breached a contractual duty to accurately 
report the status of the title at the time the 
Tower loan was closed. The record reveals 
that the only contractual privity Tower had 
with Lawyers Title was the title insurance 
policy issued to Tower by Lawyers Title 
through its local agent, Richmond Title. 
The essence of Tower's claim is that as 
part of the title insurance process, Lawyers 
Title issued a commitment for title insur-
ance to Richards-Woodbury that was not 
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updated and upon which Tower relied in 
making the loan. Tower claims that cer-
tain mechanic's liens of record were not 
included as an update to the commitment 
and that additional liens would have indi-
cated a "red flag" that the project was 
underfunded, which would have caused 
Tower to decline advancing any loan funds 
to Buildmart. 
Lawyers Title presents three arguments 
to support summary judgment on the 
breach of contract issue. Its first argu-
ment is that the only contract it had with 
Tower was the title insurance policy itself 
and that it fulfilled all requirements of the 
policy. Second, Lawyers Title argues that 
the commitment for title insurance that 
preceded the title policy was issued to Rich-
ards-Woodbury, not to Tower, and there-
fore no privity existed between Lawyers 
Title and Tower with regard to the commit-
ment. Third, Lawyers Title argues that a 
commitment or preliminary title report is 
not an abstract of title and that it should 
not be held liable for the abstractor's negli-
gence. 
[2] It is first to be observed that Law-
yers Title fully and adequately defended 
2. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 
798 (Utah 1985). 
3. See, e.g., Moore v. Title Ins. Co. of Minnesota, 
148 Ariz. 408, 411-12, 714 P.2d 1303, 1306-07 
(Ct.App.1985) (title company can be held liable 
in tort for its negligence when it holds itself out 
as a searcher of titles and provides the informa-
tion for the applicants to act upon); McLaughlin 
v. Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc., 61 111. 
AppJd 911, 18 Ill.Dec. 891, 895, 378 N.E.2d 355, 
359 (1978) (when a person seeks title insurance, 
he expects to obtain a professional title search 
legal opinion as to the condition of title and a 
guarantee); Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title 
Co., 220 Kan. 244, 553 P.2d 254, 264-66 (1976) 
(where title insurance company held out to the 
public and assumed to discharge the same 
duties as an individual conveyancer or attor-
ney); Dorr v. Mass. Title Ins. Co., 238 Mass. 490, 
131 N.E. 191 (1921) (title insurance company 
held to have acted not merely as a title insurer 
but also as a paid agent in examining the title); 
Heyd v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 218 Neb. 296, 354 
N.W.2d 154, 158-59 (1984) (when rendering a 
title report and issuing a policy, a title insurance 
company assumes the two distinct duties of ab-
stractor and title insurer); Sunset Holding Corp. 
v. Home Title Ins. Co., 172 Misc. 759, 16 N.Y. 
S.2d 273 (1939) (purchaser of realty was entitled 
tn r^rnvpr against title insurance company for 
BUILDMART MALL Utah 653 
650 (Utah 1990) 
Tower's second lien position as it was obli-
gated to do by the terms of the title insur-
ance policy. For that reason, Tower's 
cause of action for breach of an implied 
duty of good faith and fair dealing or the 
duty to bargain in good faith is unsup-
ported by the facts. Hence, we affirm the 
conclusion of the trial court that no genu-
ine issue of material fact exists with re-
spect to breach of the contractual duty of 
good faith and fair dealing.2 
[3] As to whether a title insurance com-
pany is an abstractor of title, some jurisdic-
tions hold title insurance companies to the 
standard of liability generally associated 
with abstractors.3 However, we believe 
that the better-reasoned approach is to con-
sider preliminary title reports and commit-
ments for title insurance as "no more than 
a statement of the terms and conditions 
upon which the insurer is willing to issue 
its title policy " 4 Indeed, "[t]he pre-
vailing view remains not to impose liability 
in tort on a title company." 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(82) (1986 & 
Supp.1989) defines title insurance as 
negligent examination of title where title report 
was inaccurate on dimensions of property). 
4. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 
192 Cal.App.3d 70, 237 Cal.Rptr. 264, 267 (Cai. 
App.1987) (the California Supreme Court upheld 
White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal.3d 870, 
221 Cal.Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309 (1986), which 
applied abstractor liability to title insurance 
companies, but court noted that cause of action 
arose in the Lawrence case after California leg-
islature had passed a law eliminating abstractor 
liability for title insurance companies); see also 
Brown's Tie & Lumber v. Chicago Title Co. of 
Idaho, 115 Idaho 56, 59-60, 764 P.2d 423, 426-27 
(1988) (upholding Anderson and stating that to 
fall outside of the Anderson rule it must be 
shown that abstractor duties were voluntarily 
assumed); Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 
875, 879, 655 P.2d 82, 86 (1982) (refused to 
impose the liabilities of an abstractor upon a 
title insurance company merely because it is-
sued a preliminary title report); Horn v. Law-
yers Title Ins. Co., 89 N.M. 709, 711, 557 P.2d 
206, 208 (1976) (no duty of title insurance com-
pany to search records unless express or im-
plied m the policy). 
5. Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guaranty 
Co., 116 N.J. 517, 562 A.2d 208, 219 (1989). 
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the insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnify-
ing of owners of real or personal proper-
ty or the holders of liens or encum-
brances on that property, or others inter-
ested in the property against loss or dam-
age suffered by reason of liens or en-
cumbrances upon, defects in, or the un-
marketability of the title to the property, 
or invalidity or unenforceability of any 
liens or encumbrances on the property. 
It is also to be observed that a duty is 
imposed by statute upon title insurers to 
make a reasonable search and examination 
of title for the purpose of determining in-
surability. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-20-110(l) (1986) states in part: "No 
title insurance policy may be written until 
the title insurer or its agent has conducted 
a reasonable search and examination of the 
title and has made a determination of insur-
ability of title under sound underwriting 
principles." Nevertheless, even though 
section 31A-20-110(l) imposes a duty of a 
reasonable search and examination for the 
purpose of determining the insurability of 
title, it does not impose a duty to abstract 
titles upon title insurance companies. 
"Abstractor" is not defined in the Utah 
Code; however, "abstract of title" has been 
defined as 
[a] condensed history of the title to land, 
consisting of a synopsis or summary of 
the material or operative portion of all 
the conveyances, of whatever kind or 
nature, which in any manner affect said 
land, or any estate or interest therein, 
together with a statement of all liens, 
charges, or liabilities to which the same 
may be subject, and of which is in any 
way material for purchasers to be ap-
prised. An epitome of the record evi-
dence of title, including maps, plats, and 
other aids.6 
The function, form, and character of a 
title insurer is different from that of an 
abstractor. One who hires a title insurance 
company does so for the purpose of obtain-
6. Black's Law Dictionary 10 (5th ed. 1979). 
7. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
8. Id. at 800. 
ing the assurance or guarantee of obtain-
ing a certain position in the chain of title 
rather than for the purpose of discovering 
the title status. A title insurance compa-
ny's function is generally confined to the 
practice of insurance, not to the practice of 
abstracting. Hence, Lawyers Title did not 
owe a duty to abstract the title by virtue of 
its status as a title insurance company. 
II. NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION 
The next claim asserted by Tower is that 
Lawyers Title, through its agent Richmond 
Title, negligently misrepresented the state 
of the title in the commitment for title 
insurance. The trial court held that be-
cause "negligent misrepresentation" is a 
tort claim, it could not be asserted sepa-
rately from the breach of contract claim 
when the alleged misrepresentation arose 
out of the contractual relationship of the 
parties according to our decision in Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange.1 
[4] In Beckf an insured brought an ac-
tion against an insurer for a bad-faith re-
fusal to settle a claim for insured motorist 
benefits. The insured alleged breach of 
contract, breach of implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. With re-
gard to the emotional distress tort claim, 
we held that "in a first-party relationship 
between an insurer and its insured, the 
duties and obligations of the parties are 
contractual rather than fiduciary. Without 
more, a breach of those implied or express 
duties can give rise only to a cause of 
action in contract, not one in tort." 8 How-
ever, our holding in Beck does not preclude 
the bringing of a tort claim independently 
of a contract claim. In Beckf we specifical-
ly stated: "We recognize that in some 
cases the acts constituting a breach of con-
tract may also result in breaches of duty 
that are independent of the contract and 
may give rise to causes of action in tort." 9 
9. Id. at 800, n. 3 (citing Samms v. Eccles, 11 
Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) (intentionally 
causing severe emotional distress to others); 
Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 265 Cal.App.2d 921, 
71 Cal.Rptr. 764 (1968) (breach of a duty to 
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Statutory requirements that give rise to 
independent causes of action under various 
unfair practices acts may also give rise to 
independent tort actions.10 
Negligent misrepresentation occurs 
"[w]here one having a pecuniary interest in 
a transaction, is in a superior position to 
know material facts, and carelessly or neg-
ligently makes a false representation con-
cerning them, expecting the other party to 
rely and act thereon, and the other party 
reasonably does so and suffers loss in that 
transaction " n Furthermore, "privity 
of contract is not a necessary prerequisite 
to liability." 12 
[5,6] In the instant case, Tower asserts 
a cause of action for negligent misrepre-
sentation because Lawyers Title provided a 
commitment for title insurance to Rich-
ards-Woodbury, a mortgage broker, with 
the knowledge that Tower would rely upon 
the commitment in making the loan. Genu-
ine issues of material fact exist with regard 
to whether Lawyers Title knew that Tower 
would rely upon the commitment in making 
the loan. Indications of reliance on the 
commitment may arise from the fact that 
the title insurance policy was issued to both 
Richards-Woodbury and Tower. In addi-
tion, the escrow instructions given to Law-
yers Title's agent by Tower's agent reveal 
that the loan was contingent upon the sta-
tus of the title remaining the same at the 
time of closing as it was when the commit-
ment was provided. 
Lawyers Title argues that because a 
commitment is not an abstract of title, 
Tower could not reasonably rely upon it as 
a comprehensive statement of the status of 
the title. We have heretofore concluded 
that the commitment for title insurance or 
a preliminary title report in this case was 
not an abstract of title; however, it ap-
pears that Lawyers Title's local agent, 
bargain in good faith amounting to fraudulent 
activity)). 
10. See, e,g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-5-2.5 (Supp. 
1989), 76-9-501 to -509 (1978), 76-10-706 to 
-708 (1978), 76-10-710 (1978). 
11. Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 
381, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967); see also Price-
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Richmond Title, may have assumed the 
duties and responsibilities of an abstractor 
when it received the escrow instructions 
from Tower's agent which explicitly direct-
ed Richmond not to transfer the loan funds 
unless the title status remained the same 
as stated on the commitment. 
We hold that summary judgment on the 
issue of negligent misrepresentation was 
inappropriate because our decision in Beck 
does not preclude a separate independent 
tort. In addition, material factual issues 
remain as to whether Lawyers Title owed a 
contractual duty to Tower to represent the 
true status of the title upon receipt and 
acceptance of the escrow instructions and 
at all times thereafter when Lawyers Title 
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable dil-
igence should have known, of additional 
mechanic's liens against the subject proper-
ty. Should it be determined that Lawyers 
Title owed Tower a duty of disclosure, oth-
er questions of material fact also exist, 
including whether that duty was breached 
and whether Tower reasonably relied upon 
the commitment, thereby defeating a mo-
tion for summary judgment. 
Remanded for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., and 
JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Court of 
Appeals Judge, concur. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs in the 
result. 
DURHAM, J., having disqualified 
herself, does not participate herein; 
BILLINGS, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gun-
nel!, 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986); Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 552 (1965). 
12. Price-Orem, 713 P.2d at 59; Christenson v. 
Commonwealth Land Title Ins, Co., 666 P.2d 
302, 307 (Utah 1983). 
